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Abstract
This paper examines how a respondent’s socioeconomic characteristics influence 
her willingness to support tax increases for spendi ng on highway transportation 
infrastructure  and four modes of public transportation (i.e., bus, light rail, commuter rail, 
and streetcar) in a fast growing urban area in the United States. We use and analyze 
detailed survey data at household level collected from a phone interview survey conducted 
in the Charlotte, North Carolina, area. We consider two types of response bias in the survey 
data. One is a systematic response bias which arises from protest zeros and respondents’
tendency to under-report their willingness. The other is from the randomized response 
when a respondent answers survey questions by guessing because she does not have 
memory or knowledge ofthe questions and choices. Along with random utility model, 
thesetwo response bias models are estimated and compared to each other. Empirical results 
show that an individual’s attitudes towards paying higher taxes are affected by the 
individual’s location, home ownership, and the level of educational attainment. It is found 
that respondents tend to grossly under-report their willingness to support higher taxes for 
investmentson highways, bus, and commuter railin the survey. Respondents also exhibit 
positive tendency to choose no increase in taxes in the survey about highway, bus, and 
commuter rail, although they actually prefer an increase over no increase.They have 
positive chance of randomly choosing slightly higher taxes for more investment on 
streetcar whatever her true preference is.We discuss policy implications of the empirical 
results.
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1  Introduction
This paper examines how a respondent’s socioeconomic characteristics influence 
her willingness to support tax increases for spending on highway transportation infrascture 
and four modes of public transportation (i.e., bus, light rail, commuter rail, and streetcar) in 
a fast growing urban area in the United States. We use and analyze detailed survey data at 
household level collected from a phone interview survey conducted in the Charlotte, North 
Carolina, area. The participants of the survey choose among “much higher taxes”, “slightly 
higher taxes”, and “no tax increase” for spending on highway transportation infrascture and 
four modes of public transportation.
Surveys of citizens have become a well established approach to crafting urban
public policies that reflect the sensitivities of the citizens. Many earlier quantitative studies 
use surveys to understand the demand for non-market resources, such as environmental 
amenities (Breffle, et al., 1998), pollution reduction (Dziegielewska and Mendel sohn,
2007), and biodiversity (Treiman and Gartner, 2006), and issues related to transportation 
(McFadden, 1998; Morikawa et al., 2002).When  participants in a stated preference survey 
are prompted to express a preference for, or act on a specific commodity or environmental 
good, it is frequently observed that a sizeable proportion of responses are zeros, in 
contradiction with otherwise reported intents. These so-called “protest zeros” are motivated 
by the rejection of the principle of economic contingent valuation, strategic posturing on 
the part of the respondent, or a lack of understanding of the valuation task at hand (Boyle, 
2003). They are more likely to happen when tax payments are used as vehicles for payment, 
especially inthe U.S. studies (McConnell and Walls, 2005). One major reason for this bias 3
would be that the respondent does not actually have to pay for the good in question and 
therefore more freely overstates their willingness to pay, while an over-reported value may 
also increase the chance of its provision in the future.
The presence of protest zeros brings obstacles to analyzing survey data and
understanding true preferences of the respondents because the valuation data themselves
are biased. Also, a respondent may answer survey questions by guessing because she does 
not have memory or knowledge about the questions and choices. This leads to differences 
between stated choice and intended choice, too. In this paper, we estimate random utility 
models and response bias models proposed by Hsiao and Sun (1999). The bias models, 
respectively, focuse on the situation where the systematic response bias arises from the 
respondents wanting to under-report their willingness to support higher taxes or in the 
survey and the response bias from randomized response. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Data description is provided in 
Section 2. Section 3 describes the econometric models employed in this study with a focus 
on the response bias model. We report the results of the regression exercises in Section 4. 
Based on the results, discussions on the aggregation issue and the relationship between 
residents’ attitudes and their  socioeconomic  status  are  then provided. We also discuss 
policy implications of the results of the research. Conclusions are drawn in the final section 
of the paper.
2  Data Description
Data are collected from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Annual Survey conducted by 
the Urban Institute of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. The sample involved 
400 residents in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina interviewed during the fall of 2010.
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The county contains Charlotte, the largest city in North Carolina. Respondents were asked 
about  their  willingness  to  pay  higher  taxes  for  spending  on  highway  transportation 
infrastructure and public transportation such as bus, light rail, commuter rail, and streetcar.   
Table  1  provides  summary  statistics  fo r  the  respondents’ attitudes  and  their 
socioeconomic  characteristics.  Independent variables  for  the  empirical  analys es  include 
those  collected  in the  interviews  such as  respondents’ educational  attainment,  home 
ownership, marital status, their distances to central business district, and a congestion index 
for their residenece location. Household location is measured at the zip code level. We 
dropped the observations that have missing values on the independent variables from the 
sample.  Doing  this  reduces  the sample  from  400  observations  to 382.  The  “do  not 
know/refused” responses and refusal to vote are treated as “no tax increase” votes instead 
of dropping them from the sample when estimating our models.
2 Income variable is not 
chosen as a explanatory variable because of high refusal rate on income questions which is 
typical of public opinion surveys.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Categories Percentage
Education 0-11 years 5.24 
12 years 16.49 
13-15 years  25.92 
16 years  30.63 
17+ years 21.73 
Home Ownership own 90.05 
Employment status employed 50.52 
Marital status married 73.82 
“Would you be willing to pay higher taxes, slightly higher taxes 
or no higher taxes for …”
highw ay transportation infrastructure much higher  2.09 
slightly higher  47.12 
no increase 48.95 
do not know/refused 1.83 
Bus much higher  2.62
slightly higher  33.77
no increase 63.61
do not know/refused 0
light rail much higher  9.69
slightly higher  42.15
no increase 46.60
do not know/refused 1.57
commuter rail much higher  7.85
slightly higher  37.70
no increase 51.83
do not know/refused 2.62
streetcar much higher  3.40
slightly higher  15.97
no increase 79.58
do not know/refused 1.05
Any transit mode much higher  4.19
slightly higher  39.53
no increase 54.19
do not know/refused 2.09
MIN MAX MEAN ST D
Distance to CBD 0 20.65 9.8238  4.0934 
Congestion index 1.2212  2.0374  1.6148  0.2234 
number of respondents:                           3 826
3  EstimationModels
We start with a conventional random utility model (McFadden, 1974). Let the set 
  M 0,1,..., denote the  set  of  mutually  exclusive  and  collectively  exhausitive  choice 
alternatives faced by individuals participating in the survey. In this paper, the choice set 
contains the three different hypothesized levels of future taxation that were presented to the 
respondents during the phone interview. 
Let  n indexes  respondents and 
*
n y denote  a  respondent’s  intended  response 
taking on values  } 2 , 1 , 0 { and  0
*  n y be the lowest level of tax increase,  1
*  n y slightly 
higher and  2
*  n y much higher. The ordered logit model for the intended response can be 
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where  n x is  the  vector  of  independent  variables
4 measuring  socioeconomic 
characteristics of respondent  n. Given the possible incidence of respondents’ protest vote, 
a distinction needs to be made between the stated and intended choice of each respondent. 
The  intended  choice  is  motivated  by  the  true  motivations  and  preferences  of  the 
respondent. 
Note that a respondent’s intended choice can be systematically different from her 
stated choice in our data sample, in that the latter may be affected by various reasons. Let 7
n y denote the  respondent’s actual choice  as st ated during  the survey  interview.  If  the 
respondents state their intended choice in the survey, we have the conventional random 
utility model since 
. 2 , 1 , 0 , ) = ( = ) = (
*  j j y prob j y prob n n                        (2)
One reason for the differences between stated choice and intended choice is that 
respondents  tend  to under-report their  willingnesses  to support higher  taxes.  Following 
Hsiao and Sun (1999) who model positive response bias in a product marketing research, 
we assume that there is a one-side negative respond bias in the data collected from the 
survey. Respondents whose intended choice is a specific level of taxation for open space 
tend to declare a preference  for a  lower  level of taxation  and thus present  a negative 
response  bias.  To  model such  bias,  we  i ntroduce  an  indicator  jn w with  probability 
[0,1]  jn  that  1 = jn w and  pr obability  jn   1 that  0 = jn w .  The  alternatives  are 
indexed so that larger  j denotes a higher level of tax increases. Because of the tendency 
to under-report her willingness to support higher taxes, a respondent will choose the level 
j only in the following two cases: First, her intended choice is level  j and she does not 
report a lower level than that in the phone interview (i.e.,  1 =
*
jn y and  0 = n j w  for all 
j j   ). Second, her intended choice is a level of taxation higher than  j, but she reports  j
in the interview (i.e.,  1 = jn w and  1 =
*
n j y  for all  j j >  ). Formally, the pr obability of 
each response in this study can be written as, 
, ] [1 = 2) = ( 2 0 1 n n n n F y prob    
, ] [1 = 1) = ( 2 1 1 0 n n n n n F F y prob    
and8
       ). = ( 1 = 0) = (
2
1 =
j y prob y prob n
j
n   (3)
In this model, only the respondents whose intended choice is alternative  j could have 
positive chances to choose alternative  j for  j j   in the interview. There is no chance 
that a respondent with intended choice  j will choose any hi gher level  j   ( j j >   ). It 
follows from (3) that  1) = ( > 1) = (
*
0 0 n n y prob y prob , which denotes a protest zero bias in 
our response bias m odel. This suggests that the probability of observing that a respondent 
reports no tax increase is greater than the probability that her intended choice is no increase. 
The model setup also indicates that  2) = ( < 2) = (
*
n n y prob y prob . However, the sign of 
the  difference  between  ) = ( j y prob n and  ) = (
* j y prob n for  0 > > j M could  be 
nonpositive or nonnegative.
The second reason for thepossi ble differences between stated choice and intended 
choice is that a respondent does not have memory or knowledge about the questions and 
choices. She may answer the question by guessing. To model such randomized response, 
we  assume  that  there  is  a  probability  [0,1]  jn  that  respondent  n will  choose 
alternative  j, irrespective her intended choice. Then  the probability of each response in 
this study can be written as, 
, ] [1 = 2) = ( 2 0 1 2 2 n n n n n n F y prob        
, ] [1 = 1) = ( 1 0 1 2 1 n n n n n n F y prob        
and
       ). = ( 1 = 0) = (
2
1 =
j y prob y prob n
j
n   (4)9
This model is labeled as randomized response model. 
The models can be estimated by maximizing the following log-likelihood function 
   )], = ( [ log =
0 = 1 =
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where  ) = ( j y prob n is  defined by  (2)  in t he random utility model and  by  (3)  in  the 
one-sided response bias model and by (4) in the randomized response model. The models 
are also referred to as model 1, model 2 and model 3, respectively. Sun (1995) shows that 
the MLE estimator for model 2 and model 3 is consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed with the asymptotic covariance matrix equal to the inverse of the negative of the 
information matrix. We use estimated results and statistics to determine whether there are 
response bias in our data and which model is the appropriate one.
To get a mo re  flexible  version of the  response  bias  mo del, one  can  further  let 
' =( ) jn jj n Gx  where  ) ( j G is a probability function in model 2. For more information on 
this setup, see  Hsiao and  Sun  (1999).  This  extended setup  may allow one to  link the 
characteristics of a respondent with her chance of underreporting. The links are described 
by the coefficients  '
j  s. To estimate, a format for distribution function  ) ( j G should be 
assumed. Given that survey respondents are very likely to under-report their willingness to 
support  tax increases,  we  estimate  the response bias model with  the  assumption  that 
j jn   = for any  n and  1,2 = j . The same holds true for  jn  in model 3.
4  Empirical Results
This section reports empirical results of applying the above-mentioned models to 
the survey data. All models take  logit specifications. The  results on  response bias are 10
reported  first,  followed by those on  the socioeconomic  factors that affect  respondents’
willingness to support higher taxes. The individual behavior is also aggregated to obtain a 
regional level of willingness to support higher taxes.
4.1  E stimationand model selection
We estimate three models discussed in the previous section for each transportation 
infrastructure/mode in the the survey. Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973) is used 
as  to determine  the  appropriate model  fo r  each  transportation  infrastructure/mode. The 
results for the best models are reported in Table 2. It is found that model 2 (i.e., one-side
response bias model) is the best one for the survey data on highway, bus, and commuter 
rail.  The  conventional  random  utility  mo del  is  t he  best  for  light  rail,  and  model  3 
(randomized response model) is for streetcar.
Table 2 suggests that there are statistically significant response bias in our data 
sample when the respondents face three options with respect to raising taxes for spending 
on highway, bus and commuter rail. We find that respondents tend to under-report their 
willingness to support higher taxes and that they are inclined to declare a preference for no 
tax  increase.  The  respondents  who actually  prefer  sl ightly  or  much  higher  taxes  for 
highway have about a 31.75% chance to select no tax increases during the phone interview. 
The chance  is  3 3.58%  for  the  case of commuter  rail.  A  respondent  will  have  54.97% 
chance of choosing no tax increases while her intended choice is much higher taxes or 
slightly higher taxes for bus. She will also have 30.55% chance of choosing slightly higher 
taxes if her true preference is much higher taxes. 
We find that respondents have about 9.24% chance of randomly choosing slightly 
higher taxes for more investment on streetcar whatever her true preference is. We do not 11
find any response bias in the data on light rail.
Table 2: Estimates of the willingness to support higher taxes: ordered logit models
Va riable Descriptions Transportation infrastructure/mode
Highway Bus Commuter 
rail
Streetcar Light rail
(model 2) (model2) (model2) (model 3) (model 1 )
Intercept1  -0.55 7.29* 1.91 -0.18 -1.27
(1.62) (3.97) (1.45) (1.67) (0.92)
Education  13-15 years  1.21** 0.03 0.89* -0.04 0.38
(0.54) (0.70) (0.48) (0.83) (0.33)
16 years  1.92*** 3.45 2.06*** 0.80 1.49***
(0.69) (2.36) (0.59) (0.74) (0.34)
17+ years  1.30** 5.17** 2.67*** 1.38* 1.26***
(0.60) (2.60) (0.64) (0.77) (0.36)
Marital status =1 if married 0.57 1.40* 1.56*** 0.66 0.67**
(0.44) (0.73) (0.44) (0.57) (0.27)
Employment =1 if employed 0.76* 0.00 -0.09 -0.33 0.13
(0.45) (0.59) (0.33) (0.45) (0.22)
House ownership =1 if own -2.25*** -6.00** -1.85*** -0.96 -1.25***
    (0.77) (2.89) (0.59) (0.69) (0.38)
Distance to CBD 0.06 -0.17** -0.07* -0.24*** -0.03
    (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Congestion index 0.67 -0.26 -0.68 0.02 0.85*
    (0.89) (1.42) (0.75) (0.94) (0.49)
Intercept 2 5.06*** 6.00** 3.45*** 1.31*** 2.55***
(0.79) (2.45) (0.51) (0.41) (0.19)
Response bias probability of 
respondents 

















logL  281.53 268.88 319.94 207.81 331.44
correct prediction 61.78% 63.61% 56.02% 80.63% 57.59%
Notes:  Number  of  o bservations  is  382.  Standared  errors  are  in  parentheses;  ***,  **  and  *  indicate 
signif icance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
We note that there are no specific boundaries assigned for “much higher taxes” or 
“slightly higher taxes” in the phone survey instrument. Respondents may have their own 12
interpretations of these two alternatives, which could possibly make our discrimination 
between the two choice alternatives inappropriate. Accordingly, to evaluate this possibility, 
we recode the response variable by collapsing the options of “much higher taxes” and 
“slightly higher taxes” into one single category--”higher taxes”. Estimation results for the 
reclassified response variable of higher taxes are reported in  Table A1 of the Appendix. 
The patterns of the estimated coefficients are similar as those from the models with three 
categories. Response bias are found for the cases of highway, bus, and streetcar.
To provide further information on the perfoemance of our models, we present Table 
3 which is a detailed prediction success table. Each column corresponds to a predicted 
alternative and each row corresponds to an actual choice. For example, the number 2 in the 
first row of the table is the number of persons who actually chose “much higher taxes”and 
are  predicted  to  choose  “s lightly  higher  taxes”.  We  report  the  percentage  of  correct 
prediction  for  each  category.  For  the  “s lightly higher  taxes”  alternative  for  highway, 
70.56% of our predictions are correct. The figures suggest that it is easier to predict slightly 
higher taxes than to predict much higher taxes in the models. 13
Table 3: Prediction Success Table
Transportation Predicted Alternatives










Much higher taxes 0 6 2 8 0
Highway Slightly higher taxes 0 127 53 180 70.56
No increase 0 85 109 194 56.19
Much higher taxes 0 0 10 10 0
Bus Slightly higher taxes 0 0 129 129 0
No increase 0 0 243 243 100
Much higher taxes 1 18 11 30 3.33
Commuter Slightly higher taxes 1 73 70 144 50.69
No increase 2 66 140 208 67.31
Much higher taxes 0 0 13 13 0
Streetcar Slightly higher taxes 0 1 60 61 1.64
No increase 0 1 307 308 99.68
Much higher taxes 0 29 8 37 0
Light rail Slightly higher taxes 0 100 61 161 62.11
No increase 0 64 120 184 65.22
4.2  Socioeconomic influences on individual’s willingness
We explain how an individual’s socioeconomic characteristics influence her true 
willingness to support higher taxes for the express purpose of investments on transportation 
infrastructure and different modes of public transportation. Though the empirical models 
present varying estimated coefficients, some general observations can be made.
Estimated  coefficients  for  some  of  the  education  variables are  found  to  be 
statistically significant in Table 2. Respondent with educational attainment of some college 
or higher are more likely to actually want to support higher taxes than those with lower 
level of education attainment. This result holds in most cases that are reported in Tables 2
and Table A1, and it may reflect a preference for more highway and public tansportation by 
the  educated  people  and/or  reflect  the  correlation  between  income  (which  correlated 
positively to education) and the demand for open space. The two possible sources cannot 14
be quantified because no income variable is included in the analysis. Homeowners are 
more  reluctant  to support  such  policies,  perhaps  reflecting  a  greater  tax  burden  for 
homewoners.
The location of a household and the degree of congestion also have effects on her 
attitudes. Locations of the respondents are identified through their residential zip codes 
revealed  by  themselves  in  the  interview.  Each  zip  code area’s di stance to the  central 
business district (CBD) of the city of Charlotte is measured at road miles. The estimated 
coefficient for the distance to the CBD takes statistically significantly negative sign in three 
cases—bus, commuter, and streetcar. It is insignificant in the regressions for highway and 
lightrail. More congestion around one’s resi dential area makes her more willing to support 
higher taxes for light rail. The estimated coefficient for cogestion index is not statistically 
different from zero in the other four cases. 
4.3  The regional level of willingness
The discrete choice models described above mainly focus on individual behavior of 
the  respondents,  wh ile  policy  makers are  more  interested  in  aggregate  behavior.  We 
calculate  a regional  level  of  willingness  to  support  higher  taxes  by  aggregating  the 
disaggregated  model.  The  aggregate  proportion  of  choosing  the 
th j option  can  be 
calculated by 
, ) ( ) | = ( = ) (
* dx x f x j y prob j P                        (5)
where  ) (x f is the population density of  x.  The sample being  randomly drawn,  ) ( j P
can be approximated by 
). | = (
1





x j y prob
N
j P                          (6)15
Table 4 presents the estimated results of the willingness to support tax increases at 
the  regional  level. For  comparison  purposes,  the  reported  level  of willingness  is also 
presented. If  the data is well representative of the whole population of the County, the 
models find that the regional willingness to support much higher taxes  for highway, bus 
and commuter rail are much greater than the percentage of support in the survey. It gives 
68.94% of regional willingness to support slightly higher taxes for highways which is mu ch 
greater than the level suggested directly from the survey. The source for those differences 
is the large chance of systematically negative response bias.Interestingly, there are much 
higher  level of support  for  investment on bus.  Our  model  indicates that  only  19.19% 
respondents are not willing to see tax increases for it.
Table 4: Estimated regional willingness to support higher taxes (%)
Transportation 
Infrastructure/Mode
   Reported level  Estimation
mo dels
much higher taxes  2.09 3.12
Highway slightly higher taxes  47.12 68.94
no tax increases  50.79 27.94
much higher taxes  2.62 17.30
Bus slightly higher taxes  33.77 63.51
no tax increases  63.61 19.19
much higher taxes  7.85 12.07
Commuter rail slightly higher taxes  37.70 56.35
no tax increases  54.45 31.58
much higher taxes  3.40 3.76
Street car slightly higher taxes  15.97 7.49
no tax increases  80.63 88.75
much higher taxes  9.69 9.66
Light rail slightly higher taxes  42.15 42.19
no tax increases  48.17 48.1616
5  Conclusions 
This paper examines how an individual’s socioeconomic characteristics affect her 
willingness to support tax increases for spending on transportation infrascture and public 
transportation in a fast expanding urban area. We control and estimate potential response 
bias in the data sample obtained from a survey conducted in the Charlotte, North Carolina, 
area. Individual decisions are also aggregated across the region to get a measure of the 
regional level of willingness to support.
Empirical results show that an individual’s attitudes towards paying higher taxes are 
affected  by  the  individual’s  location,  home  ownership,  and  the  level  of  educational 
attainment. It is found that respondents tend to grossly under-report their willingness to 
support higher taxes for transportation investments on hi ghways, bus, and commuter rail in 
the survey. Respondents exhibit positive tendency to choose no increase in taxes in the 
survey about highw ay, bus, and commuter rail, although they actually prefer an increase 
over no increase. They have positive chance of randomly choosing slightly higher taxes for 
more investment on streetcar whatever her true preference is.
Because the estimation framework used in the paper allows for protest zero bias and 
negative response bias, we established that support for mo re investment in the urban region 
of  Charlotte,  North  Carolina  is  m uch  mo re  widespread  than  raw survey  results  could 
suggest. 17
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Appendix
Table A1: Estimates of the willingness to support higher taxes: Results for the 
re-categoried responses
Va riable Descriptions Transportation infrastructure/mode
Highway Bus Commuter 
rail
Streetcar Light rail
(model 2) (model2) (model2) (model 3) (model 1 )
Intercept1  0.53 11.14 3.35 -0.26 -1.46
(2.97) (102.18) (2.62) (2.75) (0.98)
Education  13-15 years  1.67* 0.07 0.85 -0.10 0.32
(1.00) (0.65) (0.60) (0.43) (0.34)
16 years  2.11** 1.97 3.04** 0.28 1.54***
(0.93) (1.72) (1.23) (0.45) (0.35)
17+ years  1.54* 1.71 2.86** 0.53 1.00***
(0.83) (1.39) (1.23) (0.53) (0.37)
Marital status =1 if married 0.99 0.76 2.21*** 0.55 0.72**
(0.62) (0.73) (0.76) (0.44) (0.28)
Employment =1 if employed 1.58 0.43 0.03 -0.39 0.14
(0.99) (0.59) (0.56) (0.34) (0.23)
House ownership =1 if own -3.29 -9.99 -2.47** -0.49 -1.18***
    (2.08) (102.08) (1.03) (0.52) (0.41)
Distance to CBD -.14 -0.15 -0.16* -0.14* -0.04
    (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03)
Congestion index -0.01 -0.26 -0.84 0.09 0.99*
    (0.06) (1.65) (1.21) (0.62) (0.53)
Response bias probability of 
respondents 










logL  248.80 239.19 319.94 207.81 237.65
correct prediction 62.57% 63.61% 64.14% 80.63% 64.14%
Notes:  Number  of  o bservations  is  382.  Standared  errors  are  in  parentheses;  ***,  **  and  *  indicate 
signif icance  at  1%,  5%  a nd 10%,  respectively. Models  2  and  3  are  the  same  when  there are  only  two 
alternatives (i.e. “higher taxes” and “no tax increase” ) in the response variable. 
                                                   
1 To conduct the survey, a random digit dial sample of residential telephone numbers was purchased from a
private survey sampling firm. The random sample ensures that each household telephone in the county has an 
equal possibility of being called. Within each household, one adult (18 years or older) was designated by a 
random procedure to be respondent for the survey. This random selection procedure was designed to ensure 
that respondents of all ages and both genders were included in the survey process.
2
We also estimated the models by dropping them from the data sample. The results from this other analysis 20
are almost the same and are available from the authors.
3
In the empirical analyses reported in Section 4, the income variable is approximated by home ownership 
dummy and the dummies on the levels of educational attainment.
4
There are no choice-specific independent variables in our data sample. The discrete choice models presented 
in this paper can be extended to consider such variables.